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The maximal domain theorem by Gul and Stacchetti (J. Econ. Theory 87
(1999), 95-124) implies that for markets with indivisible objects and suciently
many agents, the set of gross substitutable preferences is a largest set for which the
existence of a competitive equilibrium is guaranteed, and hence no relaxation of the
gross substitutability can ensure the existence of a competitive equilibrium. How-
ever, we note that there is a aw in their proof, and give an example to show that
a claim used in the proof may fail to be true. We correct the proof and sharpen
the result by showing that even there are only two agents in the market, if the
preferences of one agent are not gross substitutable, then gross substitutable pref-
erences can be found for another agent such that no competitive equilibrium exists.
Moreover, we introduce the new notion of implicit gross substitutability, which is
weaker than the gross substitutability condition and is still sucient for the exis-
tence of a competitive equilibrium when the preferences of some agent are monotone.
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1 Introduction
An essential issue for markets with heterogeneous indivisible objects is under which condi-
tions an ecient allocation of objects can be supported by a system of competitive prices
as an equilibrium outcome.1 A sucient condition for the existence of a competitive
equilibrium is the gross substitutability (GS) condition, which requires that objects are
substitutes in the sense that the demand of each agent for an object does not decrease
when prices of some other objects increase. Kelso and Crawford [7] introduce a price ad-
justment procedure and show that under gross substitutable preferences, such procedure
will give rise to a competitive equilibrium.
Gul and Stacchetti [3] study markets with monotone preferences by adopting a less
restrictive condition, the weak gross substitutability (WGS) condition, which requires that
agents view objects as substitutes for each other when prices are non-negative. Based on
the price adjustment procedure by Kelso and Crawford, they rst note that under the
monotonicity assumption, WGS preferences are sucient for the existence of a competitive
equilibrium. Then they prove that the WGS condition is also necessary in the maximal
domain sense: for a market with suciently many agents, if the preferences of some agent
violate the WGS condition, then WGS preferences can be found for other agents such
that no competitive equilibrium exists.
Nevertheless, we note that there is a aw in the proof of the maximal domain result
by Gul and Stacchetti, and present an example to show that a claim used in their proof
may fail to be true. To correct the proof, we give an equivalent characterization of the GS
1A sampling of relevant works includes Kelso and Crawford [7], Bikhchandani and Mame [2], Ma [8],
Bevia et al. [1], Gul and Stacchetti [3, 4], Sun and Yang [10], and Teytelboym [11].
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condition2 and an alternative maximal domain result which shows that if the preferences
of some agent fail the GS condition, we can construct GS preferences for another agent
such that no competitive equilibrium exists in the two-agent market. This implies that
even for markets with few agents, no relaxation of the GS condition (or the WGS condition
together with the monotonicity assumption3) can guarantee the existence of a competitive
equilibrium, improving upon the Gul-Stacchetti maximal domain theorem, but making it
seem more dicult to give new existence results with conditions weaker then the gross
substitutability.
One way to circumvent the above diculty is to consider the markets in which not
all agents have monotone preferences. It should be noted that, while monotonicity of
preferences is a commonly used assumption in the literature, there are numerous economic
situations in which monotonicity is not always satised.4 For instance, an extra bed might
be a burden for an agent with a small house. We introduce the new notion of implicit
gross substitutability (IGS), which requires that allowing agents to dispose of undesirable
objects for free will make objects become substitutes, and thus exhibits substitutability
in an implicit way. We prove that the IGS condition is weaker than the WGS condition,
and is still sucient for the existence of a competitive equilibrium when there exists an
agent with monotone preferences.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we recall the Gul-Stacchetti
maximal domain theorem and give an example to show that there is a aw in the proof.
In Section 3, we give an alternative proof with a new characterization of the gross sub-
stitutability. Finally, we provide an existence result with the IGS condition in Section 4,
and present two proofs in the Appendices.
2See Theorem 3 in Section 3.
3We prove that under monotonicity, GS and WGS are equivalent. (Corollary 6)
4See Manelli [9] and Hara [5, 6] for discussions on markets without the monotonicity assumption.
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2 Gross substitutability as a maximal domain
Consider an economy with a nite set N = f1; : : : ; ng of agents and a nite set 
 =
fa1; : : : ; amg of heterogeneous indivisible objects. Let p = (pa) 2 Rj
j be a price vector,
where pa denotes the price of object a 2 
. Note that negative prices are allowed. For
any bundle of objects A  
, let A 2 Rj
j denote the characteristic price vector that
has price 1 for objects a 2 A and price 0 for objects a =2 A. We assume that agents' net
utility functions are quasilinear in prices in the sense that each agent i's utility of holding
bundle A  
 at price level p is
ui(A; p)  vi(A)  p(A);
where vi : 2

 ! R is a valuation function satisfying vi(;) = 0 and p(A) is a shorthand forP
a2A pa. The valuation function vi is called monotone if vi(B)  vi(A) for B  A  
.
We also assume that agents are not subject to any budget constraints, and hence we can
represent such an economy by E = h
; (vi; i 2 N)i.
A competitive equilibrium for economy E is a pair hp;Xi, where X = (X1; : : : ; Xn) is
a partition of objects among all agents and p is a price vector such that for all i 2 N ,




In that case, X is called an equilibrium allocation and p is called an equilibrium price
vector. The possibility that Xi = ; for some agent i is allowed.
A crucial condition for the guaranteed existence of a competitive equilibrium is the
gross substitutability. Formally, a valuation function vi : 2

 ! R is called gross substi-
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tutable (GS) if for any vector p 2 Rj
j, the following condition holds:
A 2 Dvi(p); p0  p) 9B 2 Dvi(p0) such that fa 2 A : pa = p0ag  B: (1)
Moreover, we say that vi is weakly gross substitutable (WGS) if condition (1) holds for all
non-negative vectors p 2 Rj
j+ . Note that WGS is strictly weaker than GS. Consider the
function vi : 2

 ! R given by 





It is not dicult to verify that vi satises WGS, but violates GS.
Kelso and Crawford [7] introduce a price adjustment procedure and show that under
gross substitutable preferences, such procedure will give rise to a competitive equilibrium.
More precisely, a direct application of Theorem 2 of Kelso and Crawford [7] leads to the
following result.
Theorem 1 (Kelso-Crawford) For the economy E = h
; (vi; i 2 N)i, there exists a
competitive equilibrium if one of the following conditions holds:
(a) each agent's valuation function satises the GS condition.
(b) each agent's valuation function is monotone and satises the WGS condition.
On the other hand, Theorem 2 of Gul and Stacchetti [3] shows that when there are
suciently many agents and each agent's preferences are assumed to be monotone, the
set of WGS preferences is a maximal domain for which the existence of a competitive
equilibrium is guaranteed.
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Theorem 2 (Gul-Stacchetti) Let v1 : 2

 ! R be a monotone valuation function that
violates the WGS condition. Then there exits an n-agent economy E = h
; (v1; : : : ; vn)i
such that vi is monotone and satiss the WGS condition for i = 2; : : : ; n, but no compet-
itive equilibrium exists in E.
To prove the above maximal domain theorem, Gul and Stacchetti [3, pp. 122-123] claim
that if there exists a bundle A  
 augmented with a vector p 2 Rj
j such that jAnBj > 1
and BnA = fbg, where B is an optimal solution for the problem
argmin j(AnC) [ (CnA)j
s:t: v1(C)  p(C) > v1(A)  p(A);
then no competitive equilibrium exists in the economy h
; (v1; v2; v3; va1 ; : : : ; var)i given
by 
 = A [B [ fa1; : : : ; arg,
v2(C) =
8>><>>:
0; if C \ (AnB) = ;;
maxfpa + v1(
) + 1 : a 2 C \ (AnB)g; otherwise,
v3(C) =
8>><>>:
0; if C \ [(AnB) [ fbg] = ;;
maxfpa + v1(





) + 1; if aj 2 C;
0; otherwise,
for j = 1; : : : ; r.
However, the following example shows that the claim is not correct.
Example 1 Let 
 = fa; b; cg; A = fa; cg; B = fbg, and let p 2 Rj
j be the vector such
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that pa = pc = 2 and pb = 1. Consider the economy E = h
; (v1; v2; v3)i given by
v1(C) =
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
7; if C = fa; cg or fa; b; cg;
5; if C = fbg; or fa; bg or fb; cg;
3; if C = fag or fcg;








10; if C \ A 6= ;;
9; if C = fbg;
0; if C = ;:
Clearly, the allocation X1 = fbg; X2 = fag; X3 = fcg can be supported by prices pa =
pc = 2 and pb = 1 as an equilibrium allocation.
3 A correct proof of Theorem 2
Our approach relies on the notion of improvability, which requires that any suboptimal
bundle A  
 at price level p 2 Rj
j can be strictly improved by either removing an
object from it, or adding a set of objects to it, or doing both. It should be noted that
our improvability condition is similar to in spirit, but apparently weaker than the single
improvement condition by Gul and Stacchetti [3]. Formally, a valuation function vi :
2
 ! R is said to be improvable (or weakly improvable) if for any price vector p 2 Rj
j
(or non-negative price vector p 2 Rj
j+ ) and for any A 2 2
nDvi(p), there exists a bundle
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B  
 such that jAnBj  1 and ui(B; p) > ui(A; p).
Theorem 3 Consider the valuation function vi : 2

 ! R.
(a) Assume that vi is monotone. Then vi satises the WGS condition if and only if it is
weakly improvable.
(b) The valuation function vi satises the GS condition if and only if it is improvable.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The following result shows that even for markets with only two agents, the existence
of a competitive equilibrium cannot be guaranteed by any relaxation of the GS condition.
Theorem 4 Let v1 : 2

 ! R be a valuation function that violates the GS condition.
Then there exists a GS valuation function v2 such that no competitive equilibrium exists
in the two-agent economy E = h
; (v1; v2)i.
Proof. Since v1 violates the GS condition, the result of Theorem 3 (b) implies that v1 is
not improvable. Hence, there exit a vector p1 2 Rj
j and a bundle A =2 Dv1(p1) such that
the following condition holds:
C  
 and u1(C; p1) > u1(A; p1)) jAnCj  2:
Let C be an optimal solution for the problem
argmin jAnCj
s:t: u1(C; p
1) > u1(A; p
1)
such that for any C  
,
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A \ C = A \ C and u1(C; p1) > u1(A; p1)) jCnAj  jCnA:j
Consider the vector
p2 = p1 + "  
n(A[C)   "  A\C   u1(C
; p1)  u1(A; p1)
jAnCj  AnC :
Note that there exists some " > 0 such that
A 2 Dv1(p2) = fCg [ fC  
 : u1(C; p1) = u1(A; p1); A  C  A [ Cg:
Let M = maxfjv1(C)j : C  
g and let p 2 Rj
j be the vector given by
pa =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
p2a; if a 2 C;
p2a   ; if a 2 AnC;






2)  u1(C; p2) : C =2 Dv1(p2)g > 0:
Let v2 be the valuation function given by
v2(C) = p(C) +
8>><>>:




Clearly, v2 is gross substitutable since it is the sum of an additive function and a unit-
demand function.5
We are going to prove that not competitive equilibrium exists in the economy E =
h
; (v1; v2)i. Suppose, to the contrary, that there exits an equilibrium hp; (X1; X2)i for E .
Since the allocation (X1; X2) must be ecient, we have X1  A [ C; X2 \ (AnC) 6= ;,
and hence u1(X1; p
2)+   jAnCj  u1(C; p2). Moreover, let p0 2 Rj




p2a; if a 2 C;
pa; otherwise;
then hp0; (X1; X2)i is also a competitive equilibrium for E . We consider two cases.
Case I. X1nC 6= ;. By (2) and (3), we have that p0a  p2a    for each a 2 X1nC.
This implies
u1(X1; p
0)  u1(X1; p2) +   jX1nCj < u1(X1; p2) +   jAnCj
 u1(C; p2) = u1(C; p0):
Since X1 2 Dv1(p0), this is impossible.
Case II. X1  C. Then we have AnC  X2. Since jAnC j  2, it follows that
p0a  p2a    for each a 2 AnC, and hence
u1(A; p
0)  u1(A; p2) +   jAnCj > u1(X1; p2) = u1(X1; p0):
This is also impossible.
5A valuation function vi : 2

 ! R is additive if there exists a vector p 2 Rj
j such that vi(C) = p(C)
for all C  
. A monotone function vi is unit-demand if vi(C) = maxa2Cvi(fag) for all C  
. One can
easily check that the sum of an additive function and a unit-demand function is gross substitutable.
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The following result improves upon the Gul-Stacchetti maximal domain theorem, and
implies that even for markets with few agents, no relaxation of the weak gross sub-
stitutability, together with the monotonicity, can ensure the existence of a competitive
equilibrium.
Theorem 5 Assume that there are n agents and n  2. Let v1 : 2
 ! R be a monotone
valuation function that violates the WGS condition. Then there exists a set of monotone
and WGS valuation functions, fv2; : : : ; vng, such that no competitive equilibrium exists in
the economy h
; (v1; v2; : : : ; vn)i.
Proof. Since v1 violates the WGS condition and hence violates the GS condition, by
Theorem 4, there exits a GS valuation function w2 such that no competitive equilibrium
exists in the economy h
; (v1; w2)i. Let w^2 denote the valuation function given by
w^2(A) = maxfw2(C) : C  Ag for A  
:
We rst prove that w^2 satises the GS condition.
Let w3 be the valuation function given by w3(A) = 0 for A  
, and let w4 be an
arbitrary GS valuation function. By Theorem 1, we know that there exists a competitive
equilibrium hp; (X2; X3; X4)i for the economy h
; (w2; w3; w4)i. For each bundle A  
,
let A0 denote a subset of A such that w^2(A) = w2(A0) = w^2(A0). Then we have that for
any A  
,
w^2(X2 [X3)  p(X2 [X3)  [w2(X2)  p(X2)] + [w3(X3)  p(X3)]
 [w2(A0)  p(A0)] + [w3(AnA0)  p(AnA0)]
= w^2(A)  p(A):
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This implies that hp; (X2[X3; X4)i is a competitive equilibrium for economy h
; (w^2; w4)i.
Since w4 is an arbitrary GS valuation function, the result of Theorem 4 implies that w^2
satises the GS condition.
Consider the economy E = h
; (v1; : : : ; vn)i, where v2 = w^2 and vi = w3 for i  3. We
are going to prove that no competitive equilibrium exists in E . Suppose, to the contrary,
that there is a competitive equilibrium hq; (Y1; : : : ; Yn)i for E . Since each agent's valuation
function is monotone, we have qa  0 for all a 2 
, and without loss of generality, we
may assume that Yi = ; for i  3.




2). Then for any A  
,
we have
w2(A)  q(A)  v2(A)  q(A)  v2(Y2)  q(Y2) = v2(Y 02)  q(Y 02)  q(Y2nY 02)
 v2(Y 02)  q(Y 02) = w2(Y 02)  q(Y 02);
which implies Y 02 2 Dw2(q) and qa = 0 for all a 2 Y2nY 02 . Since v1 is monotone, it follows
that Y1 [ (Y2nY 02) 2 Dv1(q), contradicting to the fact that no competitive equilibrium
exists in h
; (v1; w2)i.
Finally, we prove that under monotonicity, WGS and GS are equivalent. Based on this
and Theorem 5, it can be shown that for markets without the monotonicity assumption,
the set of GS preferences is a maximal domain for which the existence of a competitive
equilibrium is guaranteed.
Theorem 6 A monotone valuation function vi : 2

 ! R satises the GS condition if
and only if it satises the WGS condition.
Proof. Let vi : 2

 ! R be a monotone valuation function. By Theorem 3, it suces to
prove that vi is improvable whenever it is weakly improvable. Assume that vi is weakly
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improvable. Let p 2 Rj
j be a price vector such that pa < 0 for some a 2 
 and choose an
arbitrary bundle of objects A  
 such that A =2 Dvi(p). Let p+ 2 R




pa; if pa  0,
0; otherwise,
and let 
0 = fa 2 
 : pa 6= p+a g. Since vi is monotone, we have C [ 
0 2 Dvi(p+) for all
C 2 Dvi(p+), and hence
Dvi(p) = fC [ 
0 : C 2 Dvi(p+)g  Dvi(p+): (4)
We consider two cases.
Case I. A[
0 2 Dvi(p+). Let B = A[
0. Since A =2 Dvi(p), by (4), it follows that A
is a proper subset of B and ui(B; p) > ui(A; p).
Case II. A [ 
0 =2 Dvi(p+). Since vi is weakly improvable, there exists B0  
 such
that j(A [ 
0)nB0j  1 and ui(B0; p+) > ui(A [ 
0; p+). Let B = B0 [ 
0. Since vi is
monotone, we have
ui(B; p
+)  ui(B0; p+) > ui(A [ 
0; p+)  ui(A; p+);
and hence ui(B; p) > ui(A; p).
Corollary 1 Assume that there are n agents and n  2. Let v1 : 2
 ! R be a val-
uation function that violates the GS condition. Then there exists a set of GS valua-
tion functions, fv2; : : : ; vng, such that no competitive equilibrium exists in the economy
h
; (v1; v2; : : : ; vn)i.
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4 Implicit gross substitutability
The maximal domain results studied in Section 3 makes it seem dicult to establish
existence results with relaxations of the WGS condition. To make a breakthrough, we
rst introduce the notion of implicit gross substitutability (IGS), which is inspired by the
idea of \free disposal" condition, and generalizes the WGS condition. Then we prove that
the IGS condition is sucient for the existence of a competitive equilibrium when the
preferences of some agent are known to be monotone.
Monotonicity of preferences is a commonly used assumption in the economic literature.
This assumption can be justied by oering free disposal of unwanted objects. In that
case, possessing more objects does not make any agent worse o, and each agent i's
original valuation function vi would thereby be replaced by its monotone cover v^i, i.e.,
the valution function given by
v^i(A) = maxfvi(C) : C  Ag for A  
:
A valuation function vi : 2

 ! R is called implicitly gross substitutable (IGS) if its
monotone cover v^i is gross substitutable. Roughly speaking, the IGS condition requires
that allowing agents to dispose of undesirable objects for free will make objects become
substitutes for each other, and thus exhibits substitutability in an implicit way. The
following result shows that IGS is weaker than WGS.
Theorem 7 The monotone cover v^1 of a WGS valuation function v1 : 2

 ! R satises
the GS condition.
Proof. Let v1 be a WGS valuation function. Consider the price adjustment procedure
of Kelso and Crawford [7] for the economy E = h
; (v1; v2; v3)i, where v2 is the valuation
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function given by v2(A) = 0 for all A  
 and v3 is an arbitrary GS valuation function.
Since v2 is monotone and each valuation function satises WGS, it follows that each
object will receive at least one oer at the initial zero price vector 0 2 Rj
j and the
procedure will terminate at a competitive equilibrium hp; (X1; X2; X3)i such that p 2 Rj
j+
and pa = 0 for a 2 X2. For any bundle A  
, let A0 be a subset of A such that
v^1(A) = v1(A
0). Note that v2(X2)   p(X2)  0. This implies that for any A  
,
v^1(X1 [ X2)   p(X1 [ X2)  [v1(X1)   p(X1)] + [v2(X2)   p(X2)]  v1(A0)   p(A0) =
v^1(A)   p(A) + p(AnA0)  v^1(A)   p(A); and hence hp; (X1 [ X2; X3)i is a competitive
equilibrium for the economy h
; (v^1; v2)i. Together with Theorem 4, it follows that v^1
satises GS.
We conclude the paper with a new existence result, Theorem 9, in which we try to
extend Theorem 1 with the notion of IGS condition. The result of Theorem 9 relies on
a more general observation which shows that when there exists an agent with monotone
preferences, the existence of a competitive equilibrium is irrelevant to whether agents are
allowed to dispose of undesirable objects for free.
Theorem 8 Let E = h
; (vi; i 2 N)i be an economy and denote E^  h
; (v^i; i 2 N)i. If
v1 is monotone, then the following results hold:
(a) Each equilibrium allocation for E is also an equilibrium allocation for E^.
(b) Each equilibrium price vector for E^ is also an equilibrium price vector for E.
(c) E has a competitive equilibrium if and only if E^ has a competitive equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Theorem 9 For any economy E = h
; (vi; i 2 N)i, there exists a competitive equilibrium
if v1 is monotone and each agent i's valuation function vi satises IGS.
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Proof. Assume that v1 is monotone and vi satises IGS for i = 1; : : : ; n. This implies
that v^i satises GS for i = 1; : : : ; n, and hence there exists a competitive equilibrium for
the economy h
; (v^1; : : : ; v^n)i by Theorem 1. Combining with Theorem 8, we obtain the
desired result.
Appendix A. Proof of Theorem 3
The proof of Theorem 3 requires the following lemma.
Lemma 1 Suppose that the valuation function vi : 2

 ! R is weakly improvable. Then
for price vectors p; p0 2 Rj
j with p0  p and for A 2 Dvi(p)nDvi(p0), there exists A 2
argminC2Dvi (p)[p
0(C)  p(C)] such that fa 2 A : p0a = pag  A.
Proof. Let C 2 argminC2Dvi (p)[p0(C)   p(C)] and let X = fa 2 AnC : p0a > pag. In
case X = ;, we have A 2 argminC2Dvi (p)[p0(C)   p(C)] and the proof is done. Assume
that X = fa1; : : : ; arg 6= ;. Since vi is weakly improvable and
fA;Cg  Dvi(p+ 
n(A[C)) = fC 2 Dvi(p) : C  A [ Cg;
we can nd a small positive number " for which there exists
A1 2 Dvi(p+ 
n(A[C) + "fa1g)  Dvi(p+ 
n(A[C))
such that Anfa1g  A1  A [ C.
Inductively, we can construct a sequence of sets, A1; : : : ; Ar 2 Dvi(p + 
n(A[C));
such that Anfa1; : : : ; aig  Ai  A [ C for i = 1; : : : ; r. Since AnX  Ar, it follows




We are now ready to prove Theorem 3.
(a) ()) Suppose that vi is weakly gross substitutable, but there exists a bundle of objects
A =2 Dvi(p) for some p 2 Rj
j+ such that jAnCj > 1 for all C 2  (A; p)  fC  
 :
ui(C; p) > ui(A; p)g. Let B 2  (A; p) be a bundle such that jAnBj  jAnCj for all
C 2  (A; p). It follows that there exist two distinct objects a; b 2 AnB and a price vector
p1 = p+ "1
n(A[B) for some "1 > 0 such that AnC = AnB for each bundle C 2   (A; p1)
Let B 2 Dvi(p1). Since vi is monotone and A [B =2  (A; p1), we have
ui(A; p
1)  vi(A [B)  p1(A [B)
 vi(B)  p1(B)  p1(AnB)
= ui(B
; p1)  p1(AnB);
and hence p1(AnB)  ui(B; p1)   ui(A; p1). Let  = [ui(B; p1)   ui(A; p1)]=p1(AnB)
and let p2 2 Rj
j+ be the vector given by
p2a =
8>><>>:




1) [ fAg, Therefore, when the price increases from p2 to p3 =
p2 + efag, no bundles in Dvi(p
3) would contain b, violating the WGS condition.
(() Let p and p0 be two distinct nonnegative vectors in Rj
j+ such that p0  p and let
A be a set of objects such that A 2 Dvi (p) nDvi (p0).
Note that since A =2 Dvi (p0), there exists a positive number t1 2 (0; 1) such that A1 2
Dvi (t1p
0 + (1  t1) p0) and A1 =2 Dvi (tp0 + (1  t) p0) for t > t1. Let p1 = t1p0+(1  t1) p0.
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By (a) again, there exists
A2 2 arg min
C2Dvi (p1)

p0 (C)  p1 (C)
such that fa 2 A1 : p0a = p1ag  A2. Since fa 2 
 : p0a = p0ag = fa 2 
 : p0a = p1ag, it follows
that 
a 2 A0 : p0a = p0a
	  a 2 A1 : p0a = p1a	  A2:
In case A2 2 Dvi (p0), the proof is done. Otherwise, there exists a positive number
t2 2 (0; 1) such that A2 2 Dvi (t2p0 + (1  t2) p1) and A2 =2 Dvi (tp0 + (1  t) p1) for t > t2.
Let p2 = t2p
0 + (1  t2) p1. Using (a), there exists
A3 2 arg min
C2Dvi (p2)

p0 (C)  p2 (C)
such that fa 2 A2 : p0a = p2ag  A3:
Since the number of sets of objects is nite, we may inductively construct a nite
sequence of distinct price vectors p0 = pr  pr 1      p1  p0 and a nite sequence of
distinct sets of objects A0; A1; : : : ; Ar such that Ar 2 Dvi (p0) and for k = 1; : : : ; r,
1. Ak 2 argminC2Dvi(pk 1)

p0 (C)  pk 1 (C) ;
2.

a 2 Ak 1 : p0a = pk 1a




 : p0a = pk 1a
	  a 2 
 : p0a = pka	 :
This implies fa 2 A : p0a = pag  Ar; and hence completes the proof of (a).
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(b) For any arbitrary vector p 2 Rj
j, let p0 2 Rj
j be the vector given by
p0a =
8>><>>:
pa; if 8A  
nfag; pa  vi(A [ fag)  vi(A);
minA
nfag[vi(A [ fag)  vi(A)]; otherwise:
Let vpi be the monotone valuation function given by v
p
i (A) = vi(A) p0(A) for A  
 and
p 2 Rj
j+ the non-negative vector such that pa = pa   p0a for a 2 
. Since vpi (A)  p(A) =
vi(A)  p(A) for all A  
, we note that
(i) vi satises GS if and only if v
p
i satises WGS for all p 2 Rj
j; and
(ii) vi is improvable if and only if v
p
i is weakly improvable for all p 2 Rj
j.
Putting (i), (ii) and (a) together yields the desired result.
Appendix B. Proof of Theorem 8
(a) Assume that hp;Xi is a competitive equilibrium for E . We are going to prove that X
is an equilibrium allocation for E^ . Let p0 2 Rj




8><>: pa; if pa  0;0; if pa < 0:
We rst prove that hp0;Xi is a competitive equilibrium for E . Let A = fa 2 
 : pa < 0g.
In case there exists a 2 AnX1, since v1 is monotone, we have
v1 (X1 [ fag)  p (X1 [ fag)  v1 (X1)  p (X1)  pa > v1 (X1)  p (X1) ;
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violating the fact X1 2 Dv1 (p). This implies A  X1, and hence we have Xi 2 Dvi (p0)
for i 6= 1 and for each bundle A 2 2
,
v1 (X1)  p0 (X1) = [v1 (X1)  p (X1)] + p
 
A
  v1  A [ A  p  A [ A+ p   A
= v1
 
A [ A  p0  A [ A  v1 (A)  p0 (A) :
We next prove that v^i (Xi) = vi (Xi) for all i 2 N . In case there exists an agent
i 6= 1 such that v^i (Xi) > vi (Xi), there exists a proper subset B of Xi such that v^i (Xi) =
vi (B) = v^i (B). Together with the fact pa  0 for all a 2 Xi, we have vi (B)   p (B) >
vi (Xi)  p (B)  vi (Xi)  p (Xi). Since Xi 2 Dvi (p), this is impossible.
We are now ready to prove that hp0;Xi is also a competitive equilibrium for E^ . In case
there exists an agent j 6= 1 such that v^j (Xj)  p0 (Xj) < v^j (C)  p0 (C) for some bundle
C 2 2
. Since Xj 2 Dvj (p0) and v^j (Xj) = vj (Xj), we have
vj (C)  p0 (C)  vj (Xj)  p0 (Xj) = v^j (Xj)  p0 (Xj) < v^j (C)  p0 (C) :
This implies vj (C) < v^j (C) and v^j (C) = vj (C
0) for some proper subset C 0 of C, and
hence
vj (C
0)  p0 (C 0)  v^j (C)  p0 (C) > vj (Xj)  p0 (Xj) ;
contradicting to the fact Xj 2 Dvj (p0).
(b) Assume that hp;Xi is a competitive equilibrium for E^ . Note that since all agents
in E^ have monotone preference, the equilibrium price vector p must be nonnegative. We
are going to construct a competitive equilibrium hp;Yi for E such that for i 6= 1, Yi  Xi
and v^i (Xi) = vi (Yi) = v^i (Yi), and Y1 = [[i 6=1 (XinYi)] [X1.
For each i 2 f2; : : : ; ng, we choose Yi  Xi such that v^i (Xi) = vi (Yi) = v^i (Yi). Since
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Xi 2 Dv^i (p), we have
v^i (Xi)  p (Xi)  v^i (Yi)  p (Yi) = v^i (Xi)  p (Yi)  v^i (Xi)  p (Xi) :
This implies pa = 0 for a 2 XinYi, and for any subset A of 
,
vi (Yi)  p (Yi) = v^i (Xi)  p (Xi)  v^i (A)  p (A)  vi (A)  p (A) :
Let Y1 = [[i6=1 (XinYi)][X1. Since v1 is monotone and pa = 0 for all a 2 [i6=1 (XinYi), it
follows that for any subset A of 
,
v1 (Y1)  p (Y1)  v1 (X1)  p (X1) = v^1 (X1)  p (X1)
 v^1 (A)  p (A) = v1 (A)  p (A) ;
and the proof of (b) is done.
Finally, the result of (c) is an immediate consequence of the combination of (a) and
(b).
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